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ABSTRACT
Given a stream of entries in a multi-aspect data setting i.e., entries
having multiple dimensions, how can we detect anomalous activi-
ties? For example, in the intrusion detection setting, existing work
seeks to detect anomalous events or edges in dynamic graph streams,
but this does not allow us to take into account additional attributes
of each entry. Our work aims to define a streaming multi-aspect
data anomaly detection framework, termed MSTREAM which can
detect unusual group anomalies as they occur, in a dynamic manner.
MSTREAM has the following properties: (a) it detects anomalies in
multi-aspect data including both categorical and numeric attributes;
(b) it is online, thus processing each record in constant time and
constant memory; (c) it can capture the correlation between multiple
aspects of the data. MSTREAM is evaluated over the KDDCUP99,
CICIDS-DoS, UNSW-NB 15 and CICIDS-DDoS datasets, and out-
performs state-of-the-art baselines.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Anomaly detection; Online
learning settings; • Security and privacy → Intrusion detection
systems.
KEYWORDS
Anomaly Detection, Multi-Aspect Data, Streaming
1 INTRODUCTION
Given a stream of entries (i.e. records) in multi-aspect data (i.e.
data having multiple features or dimensions), how can we detect
anomalous behavior, including group anomalies involving the sud-
den appearance of large groups of suspicious activity?
In particular, we focus on an important application of anomaly
detection to intrusion detection in networks. In this application, we
want to design algorithms that monitor a stream of records, each of
which represents a single connection (or ‘flow’) over the network.
We aim to detect multiple types of suspicious activities, such as
denial of service or port scanning attacks, whereby attackers make a
large number of connections to a target server to make it inaccessible
or to look for vulnerabilities.
Recent intrusion detection datasets typically report tens of fea-
tures for each individual flow, such as its source and destination IP,
port, protocol, average packet size, etc. This makes it important to
design approaches that can handle multi-aspect data. In addition, to
effectively guard against attacks, it is important for our algorithm
to process the data in a streaming manner, so that we can quickly
report any attack in real-time, as soon as it arrives.
Some existing approaches for this problem aim to detect point
anomalies, or individually unusual connections. However, as this
ignores the relationships between records, it does not effectively
detect large and suddenly appearing groups of connections, as is
the case in denial of service and other attacks. For detecting such
groups, there are also existing methods based on dense subgraph
detection [1] as well as dense subtensor detection [2, 3]. However,
these approaches are generally designed for datasets with a smaller
number of dimensions, thus facing significant difficulties scaling to
our dataset sizes. Moreover, they treat all variables of the dataset as
categorical variables, whereas our approach can handle arbitrary mix-
tures of categorical variables (e.g. source IP address) and numerical
variables (e.g. average packet size).
Hence, in this work, we propose MSTREAM, a method for pro-
cessing a stream of multi-aspect data that detects group anomalies,
i.e. the sudden appearance of large amounts of suspiciously similar
activity. Our approach naturally allows for similarity both in terms
of categorical variables (e.g. a small group of repeated IP addresses
creating a large number of connections), as well as in numerical
variables (e.g. numerically similar values for average packet size).
MSTREAM is a streaming approach that performs each update
in constant memory and time. This is constant both with respect
to the stream length as well as in the number of attribute values
for each attribute: this contrasts with tensor decomposition-based
approaches such as STA and dense subtensor-based approaches such
as DENSEALERT, where memory usage grows in the number of
possible attribute values. To do this, our approach makes use of
locality-sensitive hash functions (LSH), which process the data in
a streaming manner while allowing connections which form group
anomalies to be jointly detected, as they consist of similar attribute
values and hence are mapped into similar buckets by the hash func-
tions.
To incorporate correlation between features, we further propose
MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and MSTREAM-AE which lever-
age principal component analysis (PCA), information bottleneck
(IB), and autoencoder (AE) respectively, to map the original fea-
tures into a lower-dimensional space and then execute MSTREAM in
this lower-dimensional space. MSTREAM-AE is shown to provide
better anomaly detection performance while also improving speed
compared to MSTREAM, due to its lower number of dimensions.
In summary, the main contributions of our approach are:
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(1) Multi-Aspect Group Anomaly Detection: We propose a
novel approach for detecting group anomalies in multi-aspect
data, including both categorical and numeric attributes.
(2) Streaming Approach: Our approach processes the data in a
fast and streaming fashion, performing each update in con-
stant time and memory.
(3) Effectiveness: Our experimental results show that
MSTREAM outperforms baseline approaches.
Reproducibility: Our code and datasets are publicly available at
https://github.com/Stream-AD/MStream.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review previous approaches to detect anomalies
on edge-streams, tensors and multi-aspect data. See [4] for an
extensive survey on tensor-based anomaly detection.
Anomaly Detection in Edge Streams uses as input a stream of
edges over time. We categorize them according to the type of anom-
aly detected.
• Anomalous node detection: Given an edge stream, [5] detects
nodes whose egonets suddenly and significantly change.
• Anomalous subgraph detection: Given an edge stream,
DENSEALERT[2] identifies dense subtensors created within
a short time.
• Anomalous edge detection: RHSS[6] focuses on sparsely-
connected parts of a graph, while SEDANSPOT[7] identifies
edge anomalies based on edge occurrence, preferential at-
tachment, and mutual neighbors. MIDAS[1] identifies mi-
crocluster based anomalies, or suddenly arriving groups of
suspiciously similar edges.
Anomaly Detection in Multi-Aspect Data Streams uses as input
a stream of multi-aspect data records over time. Each multi-aspect
data record can also be considered as an edge of an attributed graph
having multiple attributes. Therefore, in addition to detecting anom-
alies in multi-aspect data streams, the following approaches can also
detect anomalies in edge streams.
• Score Plot based: Score Plots are obtained from tensor de-
composition which are then analyzed manually or automat-
ically for anomaly detection. These score plots can be one-
dimensional: [8], multi-dimensional: MALSPOT[9] or time-
series [10].
• Histogram based: MASTA[11] uses histogram approximation
to analyze tensors. It vectorizes the whole tensor and simulta-
neously segments into slices in each mode. The distribution
of each slice is compared against the vectorized tensor to
identify anomalous slices.
• Tensor decomposition based: Tensor decomposition meth-
ods such as [12] can be used to find anomalies. [13] and
STA[3] are streaming algorithms for CPD and Tucker decom-
positions. STenSr[14] models the tensor stream as a single
incremental tensor for representing the entire network, in-
stead of dealing with each tensor in the stream separately.
[15] uses subspace learning in tensors to find anomalies. STA
monitors the streaming decomposition reconstruction error
for each tensor at each time instant and anomalies occur when
this error goes beyond a pre-defined threshold. However [2]
shows limited accuracy for dense-subtensor detection based
on tensor decomposition.
• Dense subtensor detection based: Dense-subtensor detec-
tion has been used to detect anomalies in M-ZOOM[16], D-
CUBE[17], [18] and CROSSSPOT[19] but these approaches
consider the data as a static tensor. DENSEALERT[2] is a
streaming algorithm to identify dense subtensors created
within a short time.
Other Approaches for Anomaly Detection can typically be used
in multi-aspect settings by converting categorical attributes to nu-
merical ones e.g. using one-hot encoding. Elliptic Envelope[20]
fits an ellipse to the normal data points by fitting a robust covari-
ance estimate to the data. Local Outlier Factor (LOF)[21] estimates
the local density at each point, then identifies anomalies as points
with much lower local density than their neighbors. Isolation Forest
(I-Forest)[22] constructs trees by randomly selecting features and
splitting them at random split points, and then defines anomalies as
points which are separated from the rest of the data at low depth
values.
Recently, deep learning approaches for anomaly detection in
multi-aspect data have also been proposed. DAGMM[23] learns a
Gaussian Mixture density model (GMM) over a low-dimensional la-
tent space produced by a deep autoencoder. Deep Structured Energy-
based Model for Anomaly Detection (DSEBM)[24] trains deep
energy models such as Convolutional and Recurrent EBMs using
denoising score matching instead of maximum likelihood, for per-
forming anomaly detection. More recently, methods like MEG[25]
and Fence GAN[26] have been successfully used to detect anomalies.
However, these approaches do not process the data in a streaming
manner.
We compare MSTREAM with LOF, I-Forest, Elliptic Enve-
lope, STA, MASTA, STenSr and DENSEALERT. Of these, only
DENSEALERT performs group anomaly detection (by detecting
dense subtensors); however, as shown in Table 1, it cannot effec-
tively handle real-valued features (as it treats all features as discrete-
valued).
3 PROBLEM
Let R = {r1, r2, . . .} be a stream of records, arriving in a streaming
manner. Each record ri = (ri1, . . . , rid ) consists of d attributes or
dimensions, in which each dimension can either be categorical (e.g.
IP address) or real-valued (e.g. average packet length). Note that
since the data is arriving over time as a stream, we do not assume that
the set of possible feature values is known beforehand; for example,
in network traffic settings, it is common for new IP addresses to be
seen for the first time at some point in the middle of the stream.
Our goal is to detect group anomalies. Intuitively, group anom-
alies should have the following properties:
(1) Similarity in Categorical Attributes: for categorical at-
tributes, the group anomalies consist of a relatively small
number of attribute values, repeated a suspiciously large num-
ber of times.
(2) Similarity in Real-Valued Attributes: for real-valued at-
tributes, the group anomalies consist of clusters of numeri-
cally similar attribute values.
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Table 1: Comparison of relevant multi-aspect anomaly detection approaches.
Elliptic LOF I-Forest STA MASTA STenSr DENSEALERT MSTREAM
(1999) (2000) (2008) (2006) (2015) (2015) (2017) (2020)
Group Anomalies ! "
Real-valued Features ! ! ! "
Constant Memory ! "
Const. Update Time ! ! ! ! "
(3) Temporally Sudden: the group anomalies arrive suddenly,
over a suspiciously short amount of time. In addition, their
behavior (in terms of attribute values) should clearly differ
from what we have observed previously, over the course of
the stream.
4 PROPOSED ALGORITHM
4.1 Motivation
Consider the toy example in Table 2, comprising a stream of con-
nections over time. This dataset shows a clear block of suspicious
activity from time 4 to 5, consisting of several IP addresses repeated
a large number of times, as well as large packet sizes which seem to
be anomalously large compared to the usual distribution of packet
sizes.
Table 2: Simple toy example, consisting of a stream of multi-
aspect connections over time.
Time Source IP Dest. IP Pkt. Size · · ·
1 194.027.251.021 194.027.251.021 100 · · ·
2 172.016.113.105 207.230.054.203 80 · · ·
4 194.027.251.021 192.168.001.001 1000 · · ·
4 194.027.251.021 192.168.001.001 995 · · ·
4 194.027.251.021 192.168.001.001 1000 · · ·
5 194.027.251.021 192.168.001.001 990 · · ·
5 194.027.251.021 194.027.251.021 1000 · · ·
5 194.027.251.021 194.027.251.021 995 · · ·
6 194.027.251.021 194.027.251.021 100 · · ·
7 172.016.113.105 207.230.054.203 80 · · ·
The main challenge, however, is to detect this type of patterns in a
streaming manner, considering that we do not want to set any limits
a priori on the duration of the anomalous activity we want to detect,
or the number of IP addresses (or other attribute values) which may
be involved in this activity.
As shown in Figure 1, our approach addresses these prob-
lems through the use of a number of locality-sensitive hash func-
tions [27] which hash each incoming tuple into a fixed number of
buckets. Intuitively, we do this such that tuples with many similar
entries tend to be hashed into similar buckets. These hash functions
are combined with a temporal scoring approach, which takes into
account how much overlap we observe between the buckets at any
time: high amounts of overlap arriving in a short period of time
suggest the presence of anomalous activity.
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we describe our MSTREAM approach, and
in Section 4.4, we describe our MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and
MSTREAM-AE approaches which incorporate correlation between
features in an unsupervised manner. MSTREAM-PCA uses principal
component analysis, MSTREAM-IB uses information bottleneck, and
MSTREAM-AE uses an autoencoder to first compress the original
features and then apply MSTREAM in the compressed feature space.
4.2 Hash Functions
Our approach uses two types of hash functions: FEATUREHASH,
which hashes each feature individually, and RECORDHASH, which
hashes an entire record jointly. We use multiple independent copies
of each type of hash function, and explain how to combine these to
produce a single anomalousness score.
4.2.1 FeatureHash. As shown in Algorithm 1, FEATUREHASH
consists of hash functions independently applied to a single feature.
There are two cases, corresponding to whether the feature is categor-
ical (e.g. IP address) or real-valued (e.g. average packet length):
For categorical data, we use standard linear hash functions
[28] which map integer-valued data randomly into b buckets, i.e.
{0, . . . ,b − 1}, where b is a fixed number.
For real-valued data, however, we find that randomized hash
functions tend to lead to highly uneven bucket distributions for
certain input datasets. Instead, we use a streaming log-bucketization
approach. We first apply a log-transform to the data value (line 5),
then perform min-max normalization, where the min and max are
maintained in a streaming manner (line 7) and finally map it such
that the range of feature values is evenly divided into b buckets, i.e.
{0, . . . ,b − 1} (line 8).
Algorithm 1: FEATUREHASH: Hashing Individual Feature
Input: ri j (Feature j of record ri )
Output: Bucket index in {0, . . . ,b − 1} to map ri j into
1 if ri j is categorical
2 output HASH(ri j ) // Linear Hash [28]
3 else if ri j is real-valued
4 ▷ Log-Transform
5 r˜i j = log(1 + ri j )
6 ▷ Normalize
7 r˜i j ← r˜i j−minjmax j−minj // Streaming Min-Max
8 output ⌊r˜i j · b⌋(mod b) // Bucketization into b
buckets
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Figure 1: Diagram of the proposed MSTREAM. The dimensionality reduction unit (Section 4.4) takes in a record and outputs a
lower-dimensional embedding. Two types of locality-sensitive hash functions are then applied. FEATUREHASH (Algorithm 1) hashes
each individual feature and RECORDHASH (Algorithm 2) hashes the entire record jointly. These are then combined together using a
temporal scoring approach to calculate the anomaly score for the record (Algorithm 3).
4.2.2 RecordHash. As shown in Algorithm 2, in RECORDHASH,
we operate on all features of a record simultaneously. We first divide
the entire record ri into two parts, one consisting of the categorical
features C, say rcati , and the other consisting of real-valued fea-
tures R, say rnumi . We then separately hash rcati to get bucketcat ,
and rnumi to get bucketnum . Finally we take the sum modulo b of
bucketcat and bucketnum to get a bucket for ri . We hash rcati and
rnumi as follows:
(1) rcati : We use standard linear hash functions [28] to map ∀j ∈C each of the individual features ri j into b buckets, and then
combine them by summing them modulo b to compute the
bucket index bucketcat for rcati (line 3).
(2) rnumi : To compute the hash of a real-valued record r
num
i of
dimension p = |R |, we choose k random vectors a1, a2, .., ak
each having p dimensions and independently sampled from
a Gaussian distribution Np (0, Ip), where k = ⌈log2(b)⌉. We
compute the scalar product of rnumi with each of these vectors
(line 6). We then map the positive scalar products to 1 and the
non-positive scalar products to 0 and then concatenate these
mapped values to get a k-bit string, then convert it from a
bitset into an integer bucketnum between 0 and 2k − 1. (line
10).
4.3 Temporal Scoring
A recent algorithm, MIDAS[1], finds anomalous edges of a dynamic
graph in a streaming manner. It combines a chi-squared goodness-
of-fit test with the Count-Min-Sketch (CMS) [29] streaming data
structures to get an anomaly score for each edge. In MIDAS, suv
is defined to be the total number of edges from node u to v up to
the current time t , while auv is the number of edges from node u
Algorithm 2: RECORDHASH: Hashing Entire Record
Input: Record ri
Output: Bucket index in {0, . . . ,b − 1} to map ri into
1 ▷ Divide ri into its categorical part, rcati , and its numerical
part, rnumi
2 ▷ Hashing rcati
3 bucketcat = (∑j ∈CHASH(ri j )) (mod b) // Linear
Hash [28]
4 ▷ Hashing rnumi
5 for id ← 1 to k
6 if ⟨rnumi , aid⟩ > 0
7 bitset[id] = 1
8 else
9 bitset[id] = 0
10 bucketnum = INT(bitset) // Convert bitset to
integer
11 output (bucketcat + bucketnum )(mod b)
to v in the current time tick t (but not including past time ticks).
MIDAS then divides the edges into two classes: edges at the current
time tick t (= auv ), and edges in past time ticks (= suv − auv ), and
computes the chi-squared statistic i.e. the sum over categories of
(observed−expected)2
expected :
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X 2 =
(observed(cur_t ) − expected(cur_t ))2
expected(cur_t )
+
(observed(past_t ) − expected(past_t ))2
expected(past_t )
=
(auv − suvt )2
suv
t
+
((suv − auv ) − t−1t suv )2
t−1
t suv
=
(
auv − suv
t
)2 t2
suv (t − 1)
MIDAS uses two types of CMS data structures to maintain approx-
imate counts sˆuv and aˆuv which estimate suv and auv respectively.
The anomaly score for an edge in MIDAS is then defined as:
score(u,v, t) =
(
aˆuv − sˆuv
t
)2 t2
sˆuv (t − 1) (1)
However, MIDAS is designed to detect anomalous edges, which
are two-dimensional records (consisting of source and destination
node index). Therefore, it cannot be applied in the high-dimensional
setting of multi-aspect data. Moreover, MIDAS treats variables of
the dataset as categorical variables, whereas multi-aspect data can
contain arbitrary mixtures of categorical variables (e.g. source IP
address) and numerical variables (e.g. average packet size).
We extend MIDAS to define an anomalousness score for each
record and detect anomalous records in a streaming manner. Given
each incoming record ri having j features, we can compute j + 1
anomalousness scores: one for the entire record ri and one for each
individual feature ri j . We compute each score by computing the
chi-squared statistic over the two categories: current time tick and
past time ticks. Anomaly scores for individual attributes are useful
for interpretability, as they help explain which features are most
responsible for the anomalousness of the record. Finally, we combine
these scores by taking their sum.
DEFINITION 1 (ANOMALY SCORE). Given a newly arriving
record (ri , t), our anomalousness score is computed as:
score(ri , t) =
(
aˆri −
sˆri
t
)2 t2
sˆri (t − 1)
+
d∑
j=1
score(ri j , t) (2)
where,
score(ri j , t) =
(
aˆri j −
sˆri j
t
)2
t2
sˆri j (t − 1)
(3)
and aˆri (or aˆri j ) is an approximate count of ri (or ri j ) at current
time t and sˆri (or sˆri j ) is an approximate count of ri (or ri j ) up to time
t .
We also allow temporal flexibility of records, i.e. records in the
recent past count towards the current anomalousness score. This
is achieved by reducing the counts aˆri and aˆri j∀j ∈ {1, ..,d} by a
factor of α ∈ (0, 1) rather than resetting them at the end of each time
tick. This results in past records counting towards the current time
tick, with a diminishing weight.
MSTREAM is summarised in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: MSTREAM: Streaming Anomaly Scoring
Input: Stream of records over time
Output: Anomaly scores for each record
1 ▷ Initialize data structures:
2 Total record count sˆri and total attribute count
sˆri j∀j ∈ {1, ..,d}
3 Current record count aˆri and current attribute count
aˆri j∀j ∈ {1, ..,d}
4 while new record (ri , t) = (ri1, . . . , rid , t) is received: do
5 ▷ Hash and Update Counts:
6 for j ← 1 to d
7 bucketj = FEATUREHASH(ri j )
8 Update count of bucketj
9 bucket = RECORDHASH(ri )
10 Update count of bucket
11 ▷ Query Counts:
12 Retrieve updated counts sˆri , aˆri , sˆri j and aˆri j∀j ∈ {1..d}
13 ▷ Anomaly Score:
14 output
score(ri , t) =
(
aˆri −
sˆri
t
)2 t 2
sˆri (t−1) +
∑d
j=1 score(ri j , t)
4.4 Incorporating Correlation Between Features
In this section, we describe our MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and
MSTREAM-AE approaches where we run the MSTREAM algorithm
on a lower-dimensional embedding of the original data obtained
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [30], Information Bot-
tleneck (IB) [31] and Autoencoder (AE) [32] methods in a streaming
manner.
Our motivation for combining PCA, IB and AE methods with
MSTREAM is two-fold. Firstly, the low-dimensional representations
learned by these algorithms incorporate correlation between different
attributes of the record, making anomaly detection more effective.
Secondly, a reduction in the dimensions would result in faster pro-
cessing per record.
For all three methods, we first learn the dimensionality reduction
transformation using a very small initial subset of 256 records from
the incoming stream. We then compute the embeddings for the
subsequent records and pass them to MSTREAM to detect anomalies
in an online manner.
Principal Component Analysis. We choose PCA because it only
requires one major parameter to tune: namely the dimension of
the projection space. Moreover, this parameter can be set easily by
analysis of the explained variance ratios of the principal components.
Hence MSTREAM-PCA can be used as an off-the-shelf algorithm
for streaming anomaly detection with dimensionality reduction.
Information Bottleneck. Information bottleneck for dimension-
ality reduction can be posed as the following optimization problem:
min
p(t |x )
I (X ;T ) − βI (T ;Y )
where X , Y , and T are random variables. T is the compressed repre-
sentation of X , I (X ;T ) and I (T ;Y ) are the mutual information of X
andT , and ofT andY , respectively, and β is a Lagrange multiplier. In
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our setting, X denotes the multi-aspect data, Y denotes whether the
data is anomalous and T denotes the dimensionally reduced features
that we wish to find. Our implementation is based on the Neural
Network approach for Nonlinear Information Bottleneck [33].
Autoencoder. Autoencoder is a neural network based approach
for dimensionality reduction. An autoencoder network consists of
an encoder and a decoder. The encoder compresses the input into a
lower-dimensional space, while the decoder reconstructs the input
from the low-dimensional representation. Our experimental results
in Section 5 show that even with a simple 3 layered autoencoder,
MSTREAM-AE outperforms both MSTREAM-PCA and MSTREAM-
IB.
4.5 Time and Memory Complexity
In terms of memory, MSTREAM only needs to maintain data struc-
tures over time, which requires memory proportional to O(wbd),
where w , b and d are the number of hash functions, the number of
buckets in the data structures and the total number of dimensions;
which is bounded with respect to the stream size.
For time complexity, the only relevant steps in Algorithm 3 are
those that either update or query the data structures, which take
O(wd) (all other operations run in constant time). Thus, the time
complexity per update step is O(wd).
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of MSTREAM and
MSTREAM-AE compared to Elliptic Envelope, LOF, I-Forest and
DENSEALERT on multi-aspect data streams. We aim to answer the
following questions:
Q1. Anomaly Detection Performance: How accurately does
MSTREAM detect real-world anomalies compared to base-
lines, as evaluated using the ground truth labels?
Q2. Scalability: How does it scale with input stream length and
number of dimensions? How does the time needed to process
each input compare to baseline approaches?
Q3. Real-World Effectiveness: Does it detect meaningful anom-
alies? Does it detect group anomalies?
Datasets. KDDCUP99 dataset[34] is based on the DARPA
dataset and is among the most extensively used datasets for intru-
sion detection. Since the proportion of data belonging to the ‘attack’
class is much larger than the proportion of data belonging to the
‘non-attack’ class, we downsample the ‘attack’ class to a proportion
of 20%. KDDCUP99 has 42 dimensions and 1.21 million records.
[35] surveys different intrusion detection datasets and recom-
mends to use the newer CICIDS[36] and UNSW-NB15[37] datasets.
These contain modern-day attacks and follow the established guide-
lines for reliable intrusion detection datasets (in terms of realism,
evaluation capabilities, total capture, completeness, and malicious
activity)[36].
CICIDS 2018 dataset was generated at the Canadian Institute
of Cybersecurity. Each record is a flow containing features such
as Source IP Address, Source Port, Destination IP Address, Bytes,
and Packets. These flows were captured from a real-time simula-
tion of normal network traffic and synthetic attack simulators. This
consists of the CICIDS-DoS dataset (1.05 million records, 80 fea-
tures) and the CICIDS-DDoS dataset (7.9 million records, 83 fea-
tures). CICIDS-DoS has 5% anomalies whereas CICIDS-DDoS has
7% anomalies.
UNSW-NB 15 dataset was created by the Cyber Range Lab of the
Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) for generating a hybrid
of real modern normal activities and synthetic contemporary attack
behaviors. This dataset has nine types of attacks, namely, Fuzzers,
Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shell-
code and Worms. It has 49 features and 2.5 million records including
13% anomalies.
Baselines. As described in Section 2, STA, MASTA, STenSr,
Elliptic Envelope, LOF, I-Forest and DENSEALERT operate on multi-
aspect data, whereas only STA, MASTA, STenSr, DENSEALERT are
stream-based. However, due to a large number of dimensions, even
sparse tensor versions of STA/MASTA/STenSr run out of memory
on these datasets. So, we only compare with Elliptic Envelope, LOF,
I-Forest and DENSEALERT.
Evaluation Metrics. All the methods output an anomaly score
per edge (higher is more anomalous). We plot the ROC curve, which
compares the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate
(FPR), without needing to fix any threshold. We also report the
ROC-AUC (Area under the ROC curve).
Experimental Setup. All experiments are carried out on a
2.4GHz Intel Core i9 processor, 32GB RAM, running OS X 10.15.2.
We implement MSTREAM in C++. We use 2 independent copies of
each hash function, and we set the number of buckets to 1024. We
set the temporal decay factor α as 0.85 for KDDCUP99, 0.95 for
CICIDS-DoS and CICIDS-DDoS, and 0.4 for UNSW-NB 15 due to
its higher time granularity. Since KDDCUP99 dataset does not have
timestamps, we apply the temporal decay factor once every 1000
records. We discuss the influence of temporal decay factor alpha on
the ROC-AUC in Appendix 6.1.
To demonstrate the robustness of our proposed approach, we
set the output dimension of MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and
MSTREAM-AE for all datasets to a common value of 12 instead of
searching individually on each method and dataset. We reduce the
real-valued columns to 12 dimensions and then pass these along with
the categorical columns to MSTREAM. For MSTREAM-PCA we use
the open-source implementation of PCA available in the scikit-learn
[38] library. Parameters for MSTREAM-AE and MSTREAM-IB are
described in Appendix 6.2.
We use an open-sourced implementation of DENSEALERT, pro-
vided by the authors, following parameter settings as suggested in
the original paper. For Elliptic Envelope, LOF and I-Forest we use
the open-source implementation available in the scikit-learn [38] li-
brary. We also pass the true anomaly percentage to Elliptic Envelope,
LOF and I-Forest methods, while the remainder of the methods do
not require the anomaly percentage.
All the experiments, unless explicitly specified, are performed 5
times for each parameter group, and the mean and standard deviation
values are reported.
MSTREAM: Fast Streaming Multi-Aspect Group Anomaly Detection ,
Table 3: AUC of each method on different datasets.
Elliptic LOF I-Forest DENSEALERT MSTREAM MSTREAM-PCA MSTREAM-IB MSTREAM-AE
KDD 0.34 ± 0.025 0.34 0.81 ± 0.018 0.92 0.91 ± 0.016 0.92 ± 0.000 0.96 ± 0.002 0.96 ± 0.005
DoS 0.75 ± 0.021 0.50 0.73 ± 0.008 0.61 0.93 ± 0.001 0.92 ± 0.000 0.95 ± 0.003 0.94 ± 0.001
UNSW 0.25 ± 0.003 0.49 0.84 ± 0.023 0.80 0.86 ± 0.001 0.81 ± 0.000 0.82 ± 0.001 0.90 ± 0.001
DDoS 0.57 ± 0.106 0.46 0.56 ± 0.021 −− 0.91 ± 0.000 0.94 ± 0.000 0.82 ± 0.000 0.93 ± 0.000
5.1 Anomaly Detection Performance
Figure 2 plots the ROC curve for MSTREAM, MSTREAM-PCA,
MSTREAM-IB and MSTREAM-AE along with the baselines, El-
liptic Envelope, LOF, I-Forest and DENSEALERT on CICIDS-DoS
dataset. We see that MSTREAM, MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB
and MSTREAM-AE achieve a much higher ROC-AUC (0.92 − 0.95)
compared to the baselines. MSTREAM and its variants achieve at
least 51% higher AUC than DENSEALERT, 26% higher than I-Forest,
23% higher than Elliptic Envelope and 84% higher than LOF.
Figure 2: ROC on CICIDS-DoS dataset.
Table 3 shows the AUC of Elliptic Envelope, LOF, I-Forest,
DENSEALERT and MSTREAM on KDDCUP99, CICIDS-DoS,
UNSW-NB 15 and CICIDS-DDoS datasets. We report a single value
for LOF and DENSEALERT because these are non-randomized
methods. DENSEALERT performs well on small sized datasets
such as KDDCUP99 but as the dimensions increase, its perfor-
mance decreases. On the large CICIDS-DDoS dataset DENSEAL-
ERT runs out of memory. We observe that MSTREAM outper-
forms all baselines on all datasets. By learning the correlation be-
tween features, MSTREAM-AE achieves higher ROC-AUC than
MSTREAM, and performs comparably or better than MSTREAM-
PCA and MSTREAM-IB. We also discuss evaluating the ROC-AUC
in a streaming manner in Appendix 6.3.
Figure 3 plots ROC-AUC vs. running time (log-scale, in sec-
onds, excluding I/O) for the different methods on the CICIDS-DoS
dataset. We see that MSTREAM, MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB
and MSTREAM-AE achieve 23% to 90% higher AUC compared to
baselines, while also running almost two orders of magnitude faster.
5.2 Scalability
As shown in Section 4.5, time taken by MSTREAM is linear with
respect to the number of records in the stream, dimensions in input
data, and the number of hash functions.
Since MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and MSTREAM-AE apply
MSTREAM on the lower-dimensional features obtained using an
autoencoder, they are also scalable.
Table 4 shows the time it takes Elliptic Envelope, LOF, I-Forest,
DENSEALERT, MSTREAM and MSTREAM-AE to run on KDD-
CUP99, CICIDS-DoS, UNSW-NB 15 and CICIDS-DDoS datasets.
We see that MSTREAM runs much faster than the baselines: for ex-
ample, MSTREAM is 79 times faster than DENSEALERT on the KD-
DCUP99 dataset. MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and MSTREAM-
AE incorporate dimensionality reduction and are therefore faster
than MSTREAM: for example, MSTREAM-AE is 1.38 times faster
than MSTREAM and 110 times faster than DENSEALERT on the
KDDCUP99 dataset.
5.3 Discoveries
We plot normalized anomaly scores over time using Elliptic Enve-
lope, LOF, I-Forest, DENSEALERT and MSTREAM on the CICIDS-
DoS dataset in Figure 4. To visualize, we aggregate records occurring
in each minute by taking the max anomaly score per minute, for a
total of 565 minutes. Ground truth values are indicated by points
plotted at y = 0 (i.e. normal) or y = 1 (anomaly).
LOF and DENSEALERT miss many anomalies whereas Elliptic
Envelope and I-Forest output many high scores unrelated to any
attacks. This is also reflected in Table 3 and shows that MSTREAM
is effective in catching real-world anomalies.
Group anomaly detection: In Figure 4, G is a group anomaly
which MSTREAM is able to detect, whereas Elliptic Envelope, LOF
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Figure 3: ROC-AUC vs time on CICIDS-DoS dataset.
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Table 4: Running time of each method on different datasets in seconds.
Elliptic LOF I-Forest DENSEALERT MSTREAM MSTREAM-PCA MSTREAM-IB MSTREAM-AE
KDD 216.3 1478.8 230.4 341.8 4.3 2.5 3.1 3.1
DoS 455.8 398.8 384.8 333.4 10.4 2.1 3.7 5.1
UNSW 654.6 2091.1 627.4 329.6 12.8 6.6 8 8
DDoS 3371.4 15577s 3295.8 −− 61.6 16.9 25.6 27.7
Figure 4: Plots of anomaly scores over time; spikes for
MSTREAM correspond to the ground truth events in CICIDS-
DoS, but not for baselines.
and I-Forest completely miss it. DENSEALERT can partially catch it,
but is also not fully effective in such high-dimensional datasets. This
shows the effectiveness of MSTREAM in catching group anomalies
such as DoS and DDoS attacks.
Explainability: As MSTREAM estimates feature-specific anom-
aly scores before aggregating them, it is interpretable. For a given
anomaly, we can rank the features according to their anomaly scores.
We can then explain which features were most responsible for the
anomalousness of a record in an unsupervised setting.
For example, in Figure 4, MSTREAM finds that e is an anomaly
that occurs due to the Flow IAT Min feature. This agrees with [36],
which finds that the best feature set for DoS using a Random Forest
approach (supervised learning; in contrast, our approach does not
require labels) are B.Packet Len Std, Flow IAT Min, Fwd IAT Min,
and Flow IAT Mean.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed MSTREAM for detecting group anomalies
in multi-aspect streams, and MSTREAM-PCA, MSTREAM-IB and
MSTREAM-AE which incorporate dimensionality reduction to im-
prove accuracy and speed. Future work could consider more complex
combinations (e.g. weighted sums) of anomaly scores for individual
attributes. Our contributions are:
(1) Multi-Aspect Group Anomaly Detection: We propose a
novel approach for detecting group anomalies in multi-aspect
data, including both categorical and numeric attributes.
(2) Streaming Approach: Our approach processes the data in a
fast and streaming fashion, performing each update in con-
stant time and memory.
(3) Effectiveness: Our experimental results show that
MSTREAM outperforms baseline approaches.
APPENDIX
6.1 Influence of temporal decay factor
Table 5 shows the influence of the temporal decay factor α on the
ROC-AUC for MSTREAM on CICIDS-DoS dataset. We see that
α = 0.95 gives the maximum ROC-AUC for MSTREAM (0.9326 ±
0.0006), as also shown in Table 3.
6.2 Dimensionality Reduction
For MSTREAM-IB, we used an online implementation, https://github.
com/burklight/nonlinear-IB-PyTorch for the underlying Information
Bottleneck algorithm with β = 0.5 and the variance parameter set
to a constant value of 1. The network was implemented as a 2 layer
binary classifier. For MSTREAM-AE, the encoder and decoder were
implemented as single layers with ReLU activation. We used Adam
Optimizer to train both these networks with β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999.
Grid Search was used for hyperparameter tuning: Learning Rate was
searched on [1e − 2, 1e − 3, 1e − 4, 1e − 5], and number of epochs
was searched on [100, 200, 500, 1000]. The final values for these can
be found in Table 7.
MSTREAM: Fast Streaming Multi-Aspect Group Anomaly Detection ,
Table 5: Influence of
temporal decay
factor α on the
ROC-AUC in
MSTREAM on
CICIDS-DoS dataset.
α ROC-AUC
0.1 0.9129 ± 0.0004
0.2 0.9142 ± 0.0009
0.3 0.9156 ± 0.0006
0.4 0.9164 ± 0.0014
0.5 0.9163 ± 0.0005
0.6 0.917 ± 0.0005
0.7 0.9196 ± 0.0015
0.8 0.9235 ± 0.0003
0.9 0.929 ± 0.0003
0.95 0.9326 ± 0.0006
Table 6: Evaluating ROC-
AUC of MSTREAM-AE in a
streaming manner on KDD-
CUP99 dataset.
Stream Size ROC-AUC
100K 0.912488
200K 0.895391
300K 0.855598
400K 0.934532
500K 0.965250
600K 0.953906
700K 0.947531
800K 0.961340
900K 0.973217
1000K 0.970212
1100K 0.967215
1200K 0.959664
Table 7: MSTREAM-IB parameters for different datasets.
MSTREAM-IB MSTREAM-AE
Dataset Learning Rate Epochs Learning Rate Epochs
KDD 1e − 2 100 1e − 2 100
DoS 1e − 5 200 1e − 2 1000
UNSW 1e − 2 100 1e − 2 100
DDoS 1e − 3 200 1e − 3 100
6.3 Evaluating ROC-AUC in a streaming manner
Table 6 shows the ROC-AUC for MSTREAM-AE on KDDCUP99
when evaluated over the stream. The evaluation is done on all records
seen so far and is performed after every 100K records. We see that
as the stream length increases, ROC-AUC for MSTREAM-AE con-
verges to 0.96, as also shown in Table 3.
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